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Abstract 
 
The strongest arguments for the permissibility of geoengineering (also known as climate 
engineering) rely implicitly on non-ideal theory—roughly, the theory of justice as applied to 
situations of partial compliance with principles of ideal justice. In an ideally just world, such 
arguments acknowledge, humanity should not deploy geoengineering; but in our imperfect 
world, society may need to complement mitigation and adaptation with geoengineering to 
reduce injustices associated with anthropogenic climate change. We interpret research 
proponents’ arguments as an application of a particular branch of non-ideal theory known as 
“clinical theory.” Clinical theory aims to identify politically feasible institutions or policies that 
would address existing (or impending) injustice without violating certain kinds of moral 
permissibility constraints. We argue for three implications of clinical theory: First, conditional on 
falling costs and feasibility, clinical theory provides strong support for some geoengineering 
techniques that aim to remove carbon dioxide from the atmosphere. Second, if some kinds of 
carbon dioxide removal technologies are supported by clinical theory, then clinical theory further 
supports using those technologies to enable “overshoot” scenarios in which developing 
countries exceed the cumulative emissions caps that would apply in ideal circumstances. Third, 
because of tensions between political feasibility and moral permissibility, clinical theory provides 
only weak support for geoengineering techniques that aim to manage incoming solar radiation. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Some acts are beyond the pale: They ought never to be done, except perhaps in the most dire 
emergencies. Other acts are wrong in a less stringent sense: They would never be done in an 
ideal world, but might be permissible in non-ideal circumstances. Deliberate, large-scale 
modifications of earth systems to counteract or reduce the effects of climate change, known as 
geoengineering or climate engineering, arguably belongs to one of these two types—but which 
one? Philosophers have argued that geoengineering faces diverse ethical challenges.1 Yet 
advocates of geoengineering research insist that geoengineering might someday be 
“necessary.”2 One way to construe the research advocates’ argument is as a warning that we 
might need geoengineering to cope with a climate emergency so momentous that ordinary 
moral constraints do not apply; even if geoengineering truly is “beyond the pale,” this argument 
goes, we may need it to prevent the heavens from falling, as it were. A second way to construe 
the argument is as an implicit appeal to what political philosophers call “non-ideal theory,” which 
is that part of the theory of justice that tells us what we ought to do in non-ideal circumstances. 
On this version of the argument, less-than-dire circumstances might permit or even require 
society to deploy geoengineering, even if no one would deploy it in an ideal world. These two 
arguments have very different implications for the ethics of geoengineering and geoengineering 
research. 
         This paper examines the second argument for geoengineering research, which 
construes advocacy of geoengineering research as an implicit appeal to non-ideal theory. 
(Others have already examined the first argument, which invokes potential “climate 
emergencies” to justify geoengineering research.3) The next section explains the species of 
non-ideal theory that we use in this paper. Sections 3 and 4 discuss the implications of non-
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ideal theory for supplementing mitigation and adaptation with carbon dioxide removal (CDR) 
and solar radiation management (SRM), respectively.  
 We want to issue two caveats about the interpretation of our claims in this paper: First, 
we assume that geoengineering would only be deployed as part of a larger portfolio that 
includes mitigation and adaptation, and so we do not intend anything we say to justify relying 
solely or primarily on geoengineering. Second, CDR and SRM are each broad categories 
encompassing technologies that differ in important ways. To say that non-ideal theory provides 
reasons in favor of CDR is not to say that it provides reasons in favor of every form of CDR, but 
rather that there is some form of CDR for which non-ideal theory provides reasons; and likewise 
for SRM. 
 
2. Ideal theory, non-ideal theory, and geoengineering 
A theory of justice, in Rawls’ sense, is a theory about how society ought to be structured. Much 
theorizing about justice takes the form of  “ideal theory.” That is, it asks whether a certain 
institution would exist or a certain sort of policy would be implemented in an ideally just society. 
From this perspective, geoengineering faces two problems. First, it seems unlikely that 
geoengineering would be necessary in an ideally just world, for in such a world, society would 
have begun serious mitigation efforts some time ago. This thought seems to motivate critics 
who insist that we ought to focus on mitigation and adaptation instead, as we would in an ideal 
world, rather than researching geoengineering. Achieving an ideally just world requires 
overcoming the (perceived) vices that are driving anthropogenic climate change, rather than 
manifesting them even more brazenly.4 Second and less contentiously, some kinds of 
geoengineering are likely to raise serious problems of distributive, intergenerational, and 
procedural justice.5 Thus, it is unlikely that those forms of geoengineering would be deployed in 
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an ideally just world. Traditional theorizing about justice, then, tends to weigh against 
geoengineering. 
 Concerned that such traditional theorizing provides little or faulty guidance in our 
imperfect world, many political philosophers have turned to “non-ideal theory.” We interpret 
some advocates of geoengineering research as doing the same. Non-ideal theory is that part of 
the theory of justice that tells us how to structure society and what policies to implement in 
imperfectly just circumstances. Many advocates of geoengineering research cite society’s less 
than ideal response to the threat of climate change as their rationale.6 It is precisely because 
our greenhouse gas emissions are beginning to impose unjust harms on others, they argue, that 
we must consider supplementing mitigation and adaptation with geoengineering. Thus, it should 
be unsurprising that ideal theory lends no support to geoengineering; geoengineering’s critics, 
some might say, have been considering the issue from the wrong perspective. 
 In this paper, we interpret research advocates’ arguments as relying on a particular 
strand of non-ideal theory known as “clinical theory.”7 On this approach, non-ideal theory aims 
to identify politically feasible institutions or policies that would address existing (or looming) 
injustice. As Wiens and other similarly disposed non-ideal theorists argue, the appropriate 
method for non-ideal theory is to identify clear injustices and develop institutions or policies to 
prevent, reduce, or overcome those injustices. This need not involve comparing existing or 
proposed policies with the those of an ideally just society, as proponents of other kinds of non-
ideal theory require.8 In our case, the injustice in question is the imposition of serious climate-
related risk on current and future generations, and especially on the most vulnerable members 
of those generations, most of whom bear little causal or moral responsibility for climate change. 
Thus, a large part of determining what clinical theory entails about various geoengineering 
options consists of determining whether each option is politically feasible and whether it would 
reduce that risk beyond what would be achievable solely through feasible combinations of 
emissions abatement and adaptation.9 
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As Rawls points out, even non-ideal theory is not a license to enact just any policy: even 
non-ideal policies must be morally permissible.10 But what does this mean in non-ideal 
circumstances? Rawls is vague about this issue, as is much of the rest of the literature.11 
‘Permissible’ cannot mean ‘permitted in ideal circumstances’, for that would collapse the 
distinction between ideal and non-ideal theory. Non-ideal circumstances often seem to require 
society to do things that it would not do in ideal circumstances. The question is how to identify 
actions that are forbidden in ideal circumstances but permissible in non-ideal circumstances.  
We suggest the following interpretation: It is conceptually impossible for an agent to 
perform certain kinds of acts in circumstances where everyone else acts perfectly morally and 
everyone (including the agent) knows that everyone acts morally. In particular, it is conceptually 
impossible for an agent in those circumstances to punish someone, exact retribution from 
someone, protect themselves or a third party from unjust harm, or compensate others for unjust 
harm inflicted by a third party. What ties these acts together is that they involve making one 
party worse off because of a wrong that has been or might be done to another. Since such acts 
necessarily require that someone has wronged or might wrong a third party, they cannot happen 
in perfectly ideal circumstances. We suggest that these sorts of actions, which only become 
possible in less than perfectly ideal circumstances, are the kinds of actions that may be 
permissible in non-ideal circumstances, even if physically identical actions (e.g., confining 
someone in a jail cell) would never actually be performed in ideal circumstances. Note, 
however, that protecting others from unjust aggression and punishing wrongdoers are generally 
regarded as morally permissible actions, even in some cases where they involve making some 
third party worse off. Thus, this view of non-ideal theory does not license any genuinely new 
moral principle; it simply prohibits people from objecting to an action on the grounds that it 
would not be done in ideal circumstances or that it must be wrong because it moves society 
“further away” from the ideal state by introducing an action that would be unnecessary—and 
indeed, impossible—in a perfectly just world.  
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Furthermore, we do not wish to imply that anything goes in cases of punishment or 
protection. We propose two criteria that any action must meet to satisfy this non-ideal moral 
permissibility constraint: a “proportionality criterion,” which compares the prima facie wrongs 
that a non-ideal policy inflicts with the injustice that it alleviates; and a “comparative criterion,” 
which compares a proposed non-ideal policy with other politically feasible alternatives. 
The basic idea behind the proportionality criterion is that, even in non-ideal 
circumstances, a particular act of punishment or protection is wrong if it is disproportionate to 
the good being achieved. For instance, even in non-ideal circumstances, it would be wrong to 
imprison an entire group of people on the grounds that some member of that group had been 
preying on innocent members of another group. Such mass imprisonment would protect people 
from the unjust harm in question, but it would (presumably) cause an amount of harm that is 
disproportionate to the good being achieved, and it would force innocent people to bear a 
disproportionate share of that harm. Disproportionate acts of punishment, protection, etc., then, 
are “beyond the pale.” They are forbidden even in non-ideal circumstances. 
While some cases of disproportionate injustice are intuitively clear, settling the hard 
cases would likely require sophisticated “moral modeling.” Moral modeling is a method for 
incorporating a range of moral concerns, including non-consequentialist concerns, into a 
decision-theoretic framework in order to balance competing moral concerns.12 With respect to 
some concerns, such as distributional fairness, there are well-developed methods for doing this, 
such as adjusting welfare indices for inequality of distribution. Methods for incorporating other 
concerns have yet to be developed, and so the most difficult decisions in clinical theory probably 
remain beyond our present abilities to answer. (This is, perhaps, an instance of what Stephen 
Gardiner call the “theoretical storm,” which is the inadequacy of existing moral theory to deal 
with the complexities of climate change.13) As an alternative to moral modeling, one might 
attempt to develop a set of qualitative guidelines for specific domains. Just war theory is 
essentially an attempt to develop guidelines for when and how to respond to injustice with 
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violence, which is clearly a non-ideal policy response. Such an effort for climate policy is far 
beyond the scope of the present paper. In the meantime, however, we would stress that we are 
not proposing to identify “disproportionate wrongs” with failure on a crude cost-benefit analysis; 
determining whether the injustices caused by a non-ideal policy are proportionate to the policy’s 
benefits requires casting a wider moral net than that. Furthermore, we believe that the claims 
we make in this paper about the proportionality of various non-ideal policies are not too 
controversial to assess on a more intuitive basis. 
The comparative criterion for non-ideal policies (or institutions) requires that a chosen 
policy (or institution) be better, from the perspective of justice, than any politically feasible 
alternative. This raises the question of which options count as politically feasible. Political 
feasibility depends on, among other things, the amount of financial, social, and political 
resources that advocates invest in promoting a policy. Furthermore, the amount of resources 
that an advocate should invest in promoting a policy increases as the marginal justice-related 
social gains from enacting that policy increase. So, for some policy advocate, one option is a 
politically feasible superior alternative to some second option just in case (1) the first option has 
a better ratio of injustice alleviated to injustice created; (2) the advocate has a reasonable 
chance of getting the first option enacted if the advocate invests the morally appropriate amount 
of its resources in promoting the first option; and (3) the advocate has enough resources to 
invest the morally appropriate amount in promoting the first option. (Note that the amount of 
resources appropriate for promoting the first option may exceed those that would be appropriate 
for promoting the second option.) This means that someone can be blameworthy for enacting a 
moderately unjust non-ideal policy because they could have enacted a much less unjust (but 
still non-ideal) policy, if only they had tried hard enough. Political resistance to one policy does 
not, therefore, provide carte blanche to enact unjust alternatives. This is especially true when 
political feasibility is a matter of some wrongdoers’ own akrasia or moral corruption, as opposed 
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to the refusal of some third party to cooperate with otherwise willing actors. Such concerns are 
especially prominent in climate policy, and in the geoengineering policy in particular.14 
Judging any given geoengineering policy from the perspective of clinical theory, then, 
requires answering three questions about it: Would it reduce or prevent some injustice? Is it 
politically feasible? And would it impose ills (e.g., in terms of overall harm, an unjust distribution 
of harms, unjust power relationships, etc.) that are disproportionate relative to the good being 
achieved or greater than those that could be achieved by some politically feasible alternative? 
3. Carbon dioxide removal and non-ideal theory 
CDR is a category of geoengineering comprised of techniques for removing carbon dioxide 
(CO2) from the atmosphere and sequestering it in biological, oceanic, or geological reservoirs. 
This could be done by various means, including but not limited to afforestation, growing crops 
for use as biofuels or biochar, artificially accelerated absorption of CO2 by various minerals 
(“accelerated weathering”), “direct air capture” methods that chemically leach CO2 from the 
atmosphere and sequester it underground, or ocean alkalization. Other techniques, such as 
ocean iron fertilization, have also been proposed, but are generally thought to have 
unacceptably large side effects.15 
If deployed at large scale for many decades, CDR could significantly reduce atmospheric 
CO2 levels,16 reducing the amount of harm that elevated CO2 levels would cause in the long run. 
Elevated CO2 levels cause harm in two ways: they increase radiative forcing, which causes 
climate change, and they cause ocean acidification, which damages marine ecosystems. 17 Both 
of these effects persist for hundreds or thousands of years. Given how these harms are likely to 
be distributed across space and time, greenhouse gas emissions create very long-lasting 
injustices of various kinds.18 By reducing atmospheric CO2 concentrations, large-scale CDR 
could prevent some fraction of our emissions’ long-term effect on the oceans and global climate, 
even reversing some of the effects that have already happened. Thus, it is in principle possible 
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for society to prevent serious injustice through long-term, large-scale deployment of one or more 
CDR techniques. 
 On the other hand, every known form of CDR involves significant downsides when 
deployed at large scale.19 These downsides fall into four categories: direct costs (e.g., of 
running the machinery, in the case of direct air capture), indirect costs (e.g., increased food 
prices due to increased competition for land, in the case of bioenergy with carbon capture and 
storage [BECCS]), physical risks (e.g., leaching of heavy metals, in the case of spreading 
mineral dust for accelerated weathering), and other kinds of potential injustices (e.g., “land 
grabs” that displace vulnerable populations, in the case of afforestation). These downsides 
increase with the scale and duration of deployment: Burning more biomass in any given year 
creates greater competition for arable land, spreading more mineral dust for longer periods of 
time yields a greater accumulation of heavy metals in the soil, and so on. Except in the case of 
ocean iron fertilization and very large-scale deployment of technologies that displace crop 
production, these side effects tend to be geographically localized. This is a significant ethical 
difference between most forms of CDR and SRM—a difference that, in combination with the 
capacity of all CDR technologies to reduce atmospheric CO2 concentrations, justifies thinking of 
CDR as a distinct category. 
 From the perspective of clinical theory, then, one question is whether it is technically and 
politically feasible to deploy CDR in ways that prevent more injustice than they cause. This, in 
turn, depends on the context in which CDR is deployed (e.g., the emissions trajectory on which 
society finds itself), the suite of CDR technologies being deployed, and the goal that society 
seeks to achieve through CDR (e.g., returning to atmospheric CO2 concentrations of 350 parts 
per million). For instance, we think it is vanishingly unlikely that clinical theory would support 
using CDR to keep atmospheric CO2 concentrations at their current level of roughly 400 parts 
per million under business-as-usual emissions. Even if it proves technically possible to do so, 
the downsides would be so great that such a policy could not compete, from an ethical 
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perspective, with various policies that involve moderate or (perhaps) aggressive mitigation; the 
costs of such large-scale CDR are simply too high to justify substituting it for moderate 
mitigation. 
 There are two kinds of scenarios, however, in which we think clinical theory could justify 
deploying CDR. The first scenario is one in which society supplements aggressive mitigation 
with a relatively modest CDR program.20 The best such policy, from a clinical theoretic 
perspective, involves as much mitigation as is politically feasible. The rationale here is that, as 
observed before, the costs (broadly construed) of any CDR technology increase with the scale 
and duration of deployment (after allowing for an initial fall in direct costs due to economies of 
scale). And since the injustices caused by CO2 emissions are so long-lasting, the clinical 
theoretic benefits of reducing atmospheric concentrations outweigh the downsides of these 
relatively cost-effective projects. Exactly how much CDR would be acceptable is uncertain, 
given the large uncertainties that still surround each proposed technology.  
 The second kind of scenario, called an “overshoot” scenario, is more controversial. Such 
scenarios appear in the IPCC reports and in proposals such as Tom Wigley’s.21 The basic idea 
is that global society initially exceeds its target CO2 concentration and then uses CDR to bring 
concentrations back to the target level relatively quickly. The clinical theoretic argument for 
using CDR to overshoot the long-run target concentration rests on the idea that the persistence 
of global poverty is itself a deep injustice, and that it also contributes to further injustices, such 
as the exploitation or domination of the poor by the rich. From the perspective of clinical theory, 
then, policies that reduce global poverty are to be pursued, provided that they do not involve 
disproportionate injustices. Furthermore, we assume that ceteris paribus, the more quickly a 
policy reduces global poverty, the better. We note that the rich—including both developed 
countries and the wealthier citizens of other countries—are unwilling to provide enough financial 
and technical assistance to significantly reduce global poverty, much less eliminate it. (In 
making this observation, we do not intend to imply that such assistance is either necessary or 
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sufficient for the elimination of global poverty; we are simply noting that even if it is in the power 
of the rich to significantly reduce global poverty, they seem unwilling to do so.) Thus, we hold 
that the only feasible means of significantly reducing global poverty is for developing countries 
to achieve sustained and appropriately distributed economic growth. We further hold that the 
faster that growth is and the sooner it begins, the better. 
 Achieving rapid, sustained, and appropriately distributed economic growth in poor and 
middle-income countries requires expanding energy access in those countries. As of 2010, 
some 1.2 billion people lived without electricity, and 2.8 billion people rely on solid fuels (e.g., 
wood or charcoal) for cooking. The majority of these people live in Southern Asia and Sub-
Saharan Africa.22  As those people gain greater energy access, they will greatly increase overall 
energy consumption. Enabling that consumption in a low-carbon way would require an 
additional investment of tens to hundreds of billions of dollars per year in developing countries, 
relative to the cost of powering development with fossil fuels.23 Least developed countries, in 
particular, rely heavily on external funding for climate finance.24 Other developing countries may 
be capable, in some sense, of financing mitigation on their own, but doing so would require 
them to divert significant resources away from other projects that might promote human 
development more efficiently or more quickly. Low- and middle-income countries, we conclude, 
cannot reduce poverty as quickly as possible unless they either receive large transfers of wealth 
and technology or consume large amounts of fossil fuels over the next few decades. The rich 
currently appear unwilling to finance low-carbon development at the necessary pace. 
Furthermore, we suspect that overcoming that resistance would require so much effort that, 
even given the conception of political feasibility described in section 2, such a clean 
development pathway is politically infeasible. Thus, rapidly reducing global poverty requires 
significant consumption of fossil fuels in poor and middle-income countries for the next several 
decades. 
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 Developing countries’ need for fossil fuels creates a dilemma. If developing countries 
fuel their economic development with large amounts of coal, oil, and gas, it will be very difficult 
to keep atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide below any reasonably “safe” target 
concentration. Exceeding a safe concentration, however, would exacerbate the looming 
injustices of climate change. Given the unwillingness of the rich to finance the low-carbon 
alleviation of global poverty, it therefore seems that the world must choose between the injustice 
of failing to reduce global poverty as quickly as we should and the injustice of causing more 
climate change than we should. The better we do with respect to one goal, the worse we do with 
respect to the other.25 
 By making it possible to overshoot safe atmospheric concentrations of CO2, CDR might 
offer a way out of this dilemma.  Let us stipulate that “overshooting wisely” amounts to setting 
an emissions budget for the next several decades that yields an atmospheric concentration in, 
say, 2050 that is significantly higher than our desired target concentration for 2100; thereby 
enabling developing countries to fuel more of their development with coal, oil, and gas; and then 
using CDR to reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide to the target concentration by 2100 without 
inflicting disproportionate ills. Is such a policy technically and politically feasibly? 
 It is currently impossible to say whether it is technically possible for CDR to compensate 
for significant overshooting without inflicting disproportionate wrongs. This is because drawing 
atmospheric concentrations down after significant overshooting would require deploying CDR at 
enormous scale for several decades, at least. The relevant technologies are too 
underdeveloped to give sufficiently precise estimates of their costs and side effects when 
deployed at scale. Furthermore, hysteresis in various Earth systems means that many important 
variables, from ocean acidity to ice volume to precipitation rates, lag behind changes in 
atmospheric CO2.26 So, the additional injustice caused by overshooting will persist for some 
time after CDR restores atmospheric CO2 to its target level, making it more difficult to avoid 
disproportionate wrongs. We can say, however, that the benefits of overshooting wisely could 
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be enormous. If the downsides of CDR prove manageable, overshooting wisely would greatly 
reduce the tremendous injustices associated with global poverty while avoiding the injustices 
associated with excessive climate risk. As an added benefit, by empowering people to better 
withstand and adapt to climate change, the economic development associated with 
overshooting wisely would reduce the risk from any given level of climate change. Thus, we 
think it is possible that some forms of CDR might make it possible to overshoot wisely, although 
no one has yet demonstrated that any particular form of CDR could do so. 
 The political feasibility of overshooting wisely turns on two questions: Can developing 
countries grab enough of the expanded emissions budget to fuel significant economic 
development? And would future generations stick to the plan of using CDR to draw down 
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide? Answering either of these with confidence is 
beyond our expertise, but we see some reasons to offer affirmative answers to both. With 
respect to the first question, it would be politically and logistically difficult for developed countries 
to prevent developing countries from emitting additional greenhouse gases. Thus, even if 
developed countries consume some of the additional emissions budget, developing countries 
could consume a great deal, too. With respect to the second question, the feasibility of 
overshooting wisely depends on the existence of CDR technologies that have relatively modest 
downsides. Given that overshooting would commit future generations to either deploying CDR 
or suffering significant climate change, they would have an incentive to stick to the plan. 
 We should not commit ourselves to overshooting just yet, however. It will take vigorous 
research into CDR to determine whether it is possible to overshoot wisely. And time is not our 
side. The more heavily we commit to overshooting, the harder it will be to reverse that decision 
if we learn that we cannot overshoot wisely, for committing to overshooting amounts to building 
additional carbon-intensive infrastructure that will accelerate the rise in the atmospheric 
concentration of CO2. Reversing the decision to exceed our end-of-century target concentration 
would then require even more drastic cuts. On the other hand, by investing now in emissions 
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abatement and low-carbon energy sectors in developing countries, we would be slowing the 
expansion of energy access, relative to what would be feasible if we commit to overshooting. 
Thus, it behooves us to pursue CDR research quickly; and if that research provides strong 
enough reason to think we can overshoot wisely, then from the perspective of clinical theory, we 
ought to do so. 
 
4. Solar radiation management and non-ideal theory 
 
SRM encompasses various techniques for reflecting a fraction of incoming solar radiation back 
into space, altering the amount of energy absorbed by the planet. This could be done via 
ground-based changes in the reflectiveness of the Earth, sulfate aerosol injections in the 
stratosphere, or brightening marine clouds.27 If it worked, SRM would reduce radiative forcing, 
enabling society to slow or even reverse the climatic changes caused by anthropogenic 
greenhouse gases. Thus, it seems technically possible for SRM to prevent unjust harms from 
anthropogenic climate change. 28 
However, even proponents of researching SRM hold that it is “imperfect,”29 both in the 
sense that it cannot perfectly restore a preindustrial climate and in that it would carry risks of 
dangerous side effects. It cannot perfectly restore a preindustrial climate because precipitation 
patterns would differ between the preindustrial climate and a high–greenhouse-gas world cooled 
to preindustrial temperatures.30 An artificially cooled, high–greenhouse-gas world would also 
suffer from ocean acidification, making SRM an imperfect substitute for mitigation. Salient risks 
of SRM include potential harmful changes in precipitation patterns in vulnerable regions, such 
as the Sahel31 or South Asia32 and, in the case of sulfate aerosol injections, ozone depletion.33 
Furthermore, abrupt termination in the presence of elevated CO2 levels would result in very 
rapid global warming.34 The size of these risks depends greatly, however, on the particular 
technology used, on the specific way in which SRM is deployed, and on the way it is (planned to 
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be) “turned off.” For instance, low-leverage techniques, such as increasing the reflectiveness of 
the built environment, might avoid many of these risks. Because of their low leverage, however, 
such techniques would provide relatively little relief from climate change. We focus here, then, 
on higher-leverage, higher-risk approaches. 
While some forms of SRM could  reduce or prevent climate injustice if used well, clinical 
theory would only favor effective SRM policies that are both politically feasible and morally 
permissible. Some SRM policies are probably politically feasible. Some may morally 
permissible. The question is whether there are any policies that would significantly reduce the 
harms from climate change while satisfying both constraints. 
As for the first constraint, many SRM policies seem politically feasible, especially 
compared to mitigation. Stratospheric aerosol injection is expected to be relatively cheap,35 and 
the technology needed to implement it is thought to be easy to assemble from existing 
components.36 Moreover, since unilateral or minilateral deployment of SRM is technically 
possible,37 one or more actors can implement SRM without solving as difficult a collective action 
problem as that facing mitigation.38 As the history of climate negotiations demonstrates, it is 
difficult to achieve such cooperation, since some high-emitting state may have an interest in 
either refusing to cooperate or defecting from a previous agreement to cooperate.39 Because 
different levels and patterns of SRM deployment would maximize the benefits to different 
states,40 it would be similarly difficult to achieve or approach global consensus on a specific plan 
for deploying SRM. However, given the modest costs and technological requirements of some 
SRM techniques, a single state—or, more likely, a small coalition41—could deploy SRM without 
securing the (explicit) agreement of (all) others, thus sidestepping any collective action problem. 
Of course, this does not necessarily mean that unilateral or minilateral SRM would be politically 
easy42 or that it would politically feasible for all states. Economically and militarily powerful 
states would presumably not permit less powerful ones (e.g., a coalition of small island states) 
to deploy SRM against the powerful states’ wishes. However, unilateral or minilateral SRM 
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does, for better or worse, seem politically feasible for those (coalitions of) states that are 
sufficiently powerful to be able to ignore or discount the interests of other states.43 It is therefore 
plausible to suppose that some varieties of SRM are politically feasible while others are not, the 
former set being constrained by geopolitical facts regarding what climate interventions powerful 
states are willing to accept or tolerate. Admittedly, it is difficult to predict what policies will be 
politically feasible in the medium- or long-term future. It may be that some SRM technique that 
is politically infeasible at present will be feasible in (say) fifty years. Nonetheless, geopolitical 
considerations (whatever they happen to be at the time) will constrain which SRM policies are 
politically feasible, even in the distant future, given the wide range of (often competing) interests 
various powerful states may have regarding interventions in the climate.  
Similarly, we suspect that certain ways of deploying SRM would satisfy the moral 
permissibility requirement. As we suggested above, one plausible interpretation of this 
requirement is that, in non-ideal circumstances, society may institute policies that cause harm or 
result in unjust distributions of burdens and benefits, provided that those harms and injustices 
are not disproportionate to the good achieved by the policy. On this interpretation, an SRM 
policy could be morally permissible even if it carries substantial risks of harm and injustice, as 
long as the policy delivers—or is likely to deliver—sufficiently large benefits. For example, 
suppose that SRM could buy time for several billion people to adapt to serious climatic changes, 
but in the meantime, in would cause periodic droughts in some regions. While causing droughts 
would be wrong in ideal circumstances, doing so in this case might be permissible if the slower 
pace of adaptation relieved enough suffering. Alternatively, if deploying SRM in some scenario 
caused massive harm (e.g., dramatically reducing precipitation in the Sahel) while achieving 
comparatively minor goods (e.g., moderately reducing adaptation costs in North America and 
Western Europe), SRM deployment would fail to satisfy the moral permissibility criterion in that 
scenario. 
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Satisfying both the political feasibility and the moral permissibility constraints 
simultaneously, however, is more difficult.44 As we noted above, SRM seems politically feasible 
for some states because it does not require the same level of global cooperation that mitigation 
does. Yet unilateral or minilateral SRM is morally problematic for at least two reasons. First, it 
could violate requirements of procedural justice, since it would exclude many stakeholders from 
decision-making on a matter that could affect them in substantial ways.45 Presumably, 
procedural justice requires that interested parties (e.g., those who could be at risk of harmful 
precipitation change) have some opportunity to influence decisions in which they have a 
substantial stake. Indigenous communities, in particular, many of whom could be significantly 
affected by decisions about SRM, would presumably be excluded or poorly represented in 
unilateral or minilateral deployment.46 Second, unilateral or minilateral deployment is likely to 
result in distributively unjust outcomes, since individual states or small coalitions are likely to 
prefer SRM policies that serve their own interests (e.g., in terms of temperature and 
precipitation) even when those policies are contrary to the interests of other states.47 Without 
broader participation in decisions regarding deployment, deploying states may have little 
incentive to take the interests of non-deploying states into account, and this could result in the 
harms and benefits of SRM being unjustly distributed. This is especially worrisome given that 
there is substantial overlap between the countries most vulnerable to climate risks and the 
countries with the least power to influence SRM deployment. Concerns regarding both 
procedural and distributive justice raise the question of whether unilateral or minilateral SRM 
would be morally permissible. 
To counter these concerns, one might hold that clinical theory favors deployment of 
SRM only if that deployment is multilateral, such as by allowing all interested parties to have 
some say in the matter. But an SRM policy of this variety is less politically feasible than 
unilateral or minilateral SRM—all else being equal—since the former would require agreement 
among a large number of parties with competing interests. This could be very difficult to 
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achieve, since there is room for disagreement on when and how SRM should be deployed, how 
aggressive induced cooling should be, how SRM should be monitored and adjusted, and 
whether it should be deployed at all. Indeed, one incentive for SRM-deploying coalitions to 
remain small is that broader participation is likely to make it difficult to reach agreement on the 
specific policy to be adopted.48 At least in many cases, then, the moral permissibility and 
political feasibility criteria seem to be in tension, since satisfying one could make it difficult to 
satisfy the other. 
A further tension between the moral permissibility and political feasibility criteria arises 
from the need for an “exit strategy” built into any SRM policy. On the one hand, SRM 
deployment becomes more morally problematic the longer it lasts: If deployment continues 
indefinitely because the world fails to rein in its greenhouse gas emissions, then the required 
increase in SRM intensity would increase the physical risks associated with SRM. But if the 
world does rein in its emissions, then the main justification for continued SRM would evaporate. 
Assuming a lack of international agreement about the proper level of deployment, continued 
deployment would then impose risks on certain regions in violation of the demands of 
procedural justice, which would apply more strictly in the absence of pressing climate risk. With 
or without emissions abatement, then, indefinite deployment would put pressure on the moral 
permissibility requirement, either because of procedural injustice or potentially harmful or unjust 
impacts of perpetually intensifying, long-term SRM. On the other hand, only a gradual 
termination of SRM could avoid catastrophe. Abrupt termination, such as might be caused by a 
global disaster, could unleash catastrophic warming in the context of high greenhouse gas 
concentrations.49 Gradual termination would allow delayed warming to occur in a controlled 
fashion. The question, then, is whether such an exit strategy is politically feasible. Some 
commentators worry that it is not. They fear that society will be unable to reduce emissions, 
especially once SRM eases the (prospective) pain of climate change. If that is true, to deploy 
SRM is effectively to commit the world to SRM in perpetuity.50 
19 
One response is to argue that unmitigated climate change creates such enormous risks 
that unilateral or minilateral SRM would be morally permissible, even without a clear exit 
strategy. In keeping with our proportionality interpretation of moral permissibility, perhaps the 
benefits secured by SRM would be large enough to justify the distributive and procedural 
injustice SRM could involve—especially if the harms and injustice of anthropogenic climate 
change continue to mount over the coming decades. This raises the possibility that some variety 
of SRM might become morally permissible in the future even if it is impermissible at present. It is 
difficult to predict if and when this would be the case, given uncertainties regarding the impacts 
of both anthropogenic climate change and deployment of particular SRM techniques. 
Nonetheless, if climate change continues to worsen, it is plausible to think that meeting the 
moral permissibility condition will become easier for SRM. 
On the other hand, acknowledging the injustice involved in such unilateral or minilateral 
deployment implies that the moral permissibility constraint applies more stringently to them than 
to multilateral deployment: The moral permissibility constraint requires that a policy’s benefits 
must be proportionate to both the harms and the injustices it causes. In other words, the greater 
the procedural and distributive injustices that some SRM policy involves, the higher the bar 
becomes for how much good that specific policy must secure in order to be morally permissible.  
But this suggests that satisfying the moral permissibility condition is more difficult than we might 
have supposed. 
In short, it is possible that clinical theory could justify some policies involving SRM 
deployment (again, in conjunction with abatement and adaptation). It would do so in a fairly 
straightforward way for low-leverage techniques, like increasing the reflectiveness of the built 
environment. Identifying suitable high-leverage policies—if there are any—requires attention not 
just to the physical effects of a particular policy, but also and at the same time to the political 
and ethical dimensions of the policy. This lends further support to the argument that scientific 
study of SRM proposals must proceed simultaneously with social and ethical assessment of 
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those proposals, rather than prior to such assessment.51  Such research, of course, must also 
respect the constraints of (non-ideal) justice with respect to both physical risks associated with 
certain kinds of experimentation and the so-called “moral hazards” of pursuing SRM research at 
all.52   
 
5. Conclusion 
In this paper, we have elaborated a common but previously underdeveloped argument in favor 
of researching and perhaps deploying geoengineering. The argument attempts to circumvent 
various ethical objections to geoengineering by appealing to the non-ideal circumstances in 
which we find ourselves. This places it squarely in the realm of what political philosophers call 
non-ideal theory, particularly in its “clinical” guise. We argued that clinical theory provides 
different levels of support for different kinds of geoengineering. Clinical theory provides 
significant but conditional support for certain uses of CDR. More specifically, it provides 
relatively strong support for supplementing aggressive mitigation with whichever forms of CDR 
prove to especially cost-effective, and it provides more cautious support for using CDR to 
enable “overshoot” scenarios. But clinical theory provides only weak support for SRM: While it is 
technically possible for SRM to reduce unjust harms from climate change, its side effects and 
unevenly distributed benefits make it unlikely, in our estimation, that any particular SRM policy 
would be both morally permissible and politically feasible. Finally, our analysis suggests that, 
from the perspective of clinical theory, research should continue into both CDR and SRM, within 
the constraints of research ethics. 
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